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Enhancing the Effectiveness of
Independent Directors:
Is the System Broken, Creaking
or Working?
David A. Sturms*
The New York Times recently asked: "What's a mutual
fund director to do?... [Wihen independent directors have
stood up to fund managers, they've gotten their ears
boxed. And when.., the directors have let fund managers
go their own way, they've gotten their ears boxed again."'
For example, the directors of three mutual funds who
sought to fulfill their fiduciary duties by taking issue with
their funds' investment advisers were targets of heated
proxy battles and/or costly litigation. On the other hand,
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission")
brought charges against the independent directors of
another mutual fund for failing to challenge the
investment adviser's valuation of portfolio securities;
shareholders have brought suit against independent
directors for being "house boards" indebted to, and
controlled and dominated by, the investment adviser; and
a recent study has questioned the independence of
directors by pointing out that the more independent
directors are paid, the higher a mutual fund's expenses.
2
This crossfire of criticism caused the New York Times to
exclaim that "rarely, if ever, ... have fund directors been
* David A. Sturms is a partner at Vedder, Price, Kaufman &
Kammholz. This article is adapted from a presentation by Mr. Sturms at
the SEC Roundtable on the Role of Independent Investment Company
Directors (February 23-24, 1999).
'Edward Wyatt, Empty Suits in the Boardroom: Under Fire, Mutual
Flund Directors Seem Increasingly Hamstrung, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1998,
at Cl.
2 See Michael Mulvihill, A Question of Trust, Morningstar Mutual
Funds, Aug. 30, 1996 (hereinafter MORNINGSTAR STUDY). For a discussion
of the MORNINGSTAR STUDY examining the relationship between the
compensation of independent directors and mutual fund expenses, see
the text accompanying note 3 1, infra.
1
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under fire on so many fronts at once." 3 It is appropriate,
therefore, to reexamine the role of independent directors
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the
"Investment Company Act"). Are they, as some have
complained, an ineffectual archaism that cannot provide
meaningful oversight or, as others have claimed, the
cornerstone of the Investment Company Act? Let the
debate begin.
I. THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN
A. THEORY VERSUS REALITY
In theory, a mutual fund is owned by its shareholders
who hire independent directors to run it. The directors, in
turn, select various service providers, including an
investment adviser, to manage the fund. In reality, a
mutual fund is usually created, sponsored and operated
by the adviser. It is the investment adviser's services, not
the directors', that investors buy.
Given such a chasm between theory and reality, is it any
wonder that independent directors have been accused of
being ineffectual? As one commentator has stated:
Recent discussions of problems in the mutual fund
industry ... contain numerous statements of opinion
that, in many cases, [independent] directors of mutual
funds have not performed an effective role in
safeguarding the interests of mutual fund
shareholders.... [Independent] directors normally lack
the power to exercise meaningful restraints on the
investment adviser or principal underwriter .... 4
What's amazing to this author is that the above passage
is not from a recent publication, but from a 1967 law
review article. In the words of Yogi Berra, "It's dojet vu all
over again."
3 See Wyatt, supra note 1.
4Robert H. Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and
Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 1058, 1058 (1967).
2
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The distance between theory and reality most obviously
manifests itself in the practical inability of independent
directors to terminate an investment adviser, let alone
negotiate its fees. As the Commission noted in 1966:
It has been the Commission's experience in the adminis-
tration of the [Investment Company] Act that in general
the [independent] directors have not been in a position
to secure changes in the level of advisory fee rates in the
mutual fund industry....
The possibility of disrupting the fund's operations, the
prospect of a bitter and expensive proxy contest, and the
risk and uncertainty involved in replacing the entire
fund management organization with a new and untested
one, make termination of the existing advisory relation-
ship a wholly unrealistic alternative in negotiations over
advisory fees. Without such an alternative, advisory fees
negotiated between advisers and the [independent] di-
rectors lack the essential element of arm's-length trans-
actions and provide inadequate assurance that the fees
bear a reasonable relationship to the price at which sim-
ilar services could be obtained in a genuinely competitive
market.
The Commission's commentary certainly foreshadowed
events of today, as independent directors have faced off
with investment advisers, and lost. These cases point out
what many have long recognized - that the independent
directors' legal ability to terminate an advisory agreement
or negotiate fees may be a legal fiction. 6 Knowing that they
have the legal equivalent of a nuclear bomb (that is, the
5 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at
131 (1966) (hereinafter PPI).
6 For example, the Internal Revenue Service, in its guide for field
agents in the examination of investment adviser income tax returns,
recognized the reality: "It is the investment adviser's strong expectation
of earning fees indefinitely by managing a mutual fund's portfolio that
motivates an adviser to create a mutual fund. It is widely accepted
within the industry that investment management contracts continue
indefinitely, notwithstanding the [Investment Company] Act require-
ment that the contract be approved at least annually by its board of
3
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ability to terminate an advisory contract), but the practical
inability to use it, has caused some independent directors
to believe they have been thrust into a Twilight Zone poker
game, where they have been dealt a royal flush, but look
down and realize that they do not have any chips.
B. ATTACKS ON INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
1. The Investment Adviser versus the Independent
Directors: Navellier, Fundamental and Yacktman
Navellier. A dispute arose between Navellier
Management, Inc. ("Navellier") and the independent
directors 7 of the Navellier Series Fund in connection with a
proposed merger of the Aggressive Small Cap Equity
Portfolio of the Navellier Series Fund, a low-load series
mutual fund, into the Navellier Performance Funds, a
separate no-load series fund.8 The independent directors
requested certain information from Navellier as part of
their consideration of this merger proposal, which
Navellier refused to provide on the basis that such
information was not relevant to the merger proposal. The
independent directors refused to approve the merger
proposal.
While this dispute was proceeding, Navellier's advisory
contract with the Navellier Series Fund came up for
renewal by the board. The independent directors voted
against renewing Navellier's contract and voted to hire
Massachusetts Financial Services ("MFS") as the mutual
fund's new investment adviser. The independent directors
also voted to remove Louis Navellier, president of Navelier,
as a director of the fund. A shareholder derivative suit was
directors or trustees, including a majority of the [independent direc-
tors]." Int. Rev. Ser., U. S. Dept. of Treas., Examination Guide: Determi-
nation of Costs to Set Up Management Contracts for Mutual Funds, Doc-
ument 10,246 (1-98), Catalog Number 25,372N, at 5.
7The Navellier Series Fund is a Delaware business trust, and, as
such, has trustees, not directors. Nevertheless, for purposes of this
discussion and this article in general, the term directors is used.
8The proposed merger would have terminated the independent
directors' positions.
4
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then filed in federal court by Mr. Navellier and others
against the independent directors and their counsel,
seeking to enjoin the independent directors from removing
Mr. Navellier as a director of the mutual fund.
A proxy contest ensued between the mutual fund and
Navellier. The plaintiffs in the derivative suit brought a
series of motions for injunctive relief, unsuccessfully
attempting to prevent the shareholders meeting. When the
shareholders meeting was held, the requisite shareholder
vote to approve the mutual fund's advisory contract with
MFS was not received. Navellier eventually was reinstated
as investment adviser to the fund. The independent
directors resigned. The plaintiffs in the original derivative
suit then amended their complaint to, among other things,
add MFS as a defendant and add several new causes of
action against the independent directors, including breach
of fiduciary duty under section 36(a) of the Investment
Company Act and, under Delaware law, corporate waste
and interference with prospective economic relations. 9 The
court found that Congress intended shareholders to have
an implied -private right of action under section 36(a) of the
Act and allowed this claim to go forward against the
independent directors. 10 The court also refused to grant a
motion to dismiss on the basis that the independent
directors' actions were protected by the business judgment
rule. 11
Fundamental. The dissension between Fundamental
Portfolio Advisors, Inc. ("Fundamental") and the indepen-
dent directors of its New York Municipal Bond Fund
9 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1998). See McLachlan, et al., v. Simon, et al.,
31 F. Supp. 731, 735-36 (N.D. Cal. 1998).10 Id. at 736-37. The court also allowed the claims of corporate waste
and intefference with prospective economic relations to go forward
against the independent directors. All the claims against MFS and the
independent directors' counsel were dismissed. Id. at 740-44.
" Id. at 738. 'The business judgment rule 'is a presumption that in
making a business decision the independent directors of a company
acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interest of the company' ". Id. at 737
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 437 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Supp. 1984)).
5
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stemmed in large part from a Commission enforcement
action brought against Fundamental for fraudulently mar-
keting the mutual fund as a safe investment and failing to
properly disclose the risks of the fund's substantial invest-
ments in inverse floaters. 12 The mutual fund's past invest-
ment performance also had been erratic, and at that time
it was the only tax-exempt mutual fund that had lost
money over the previous five years. The board voted to
seek a replacement investment adviser.
Fundamental's president suggested Tocqueville Asset
Management ('Tocqueville") as a potential replacement,
and the board approved an interim advisory agreement
with Tocqueville, subject to shareholder approval. The
board later discovered that a portfolio manager at
Tocquevifle had been routing trades through an affiliated
brokerage firm, which caused a disagreement among the
mutual fund's four independent directors regarding the
selection of Tocqueville as a replacement investment
adviser. The two independent directors who opposed
hiring Tocqueville resigned. The board, including the two
remaining independent directors, filed a proxy statement
seeking shareholder approval of the advisory contract with
Tocqueville. In response, Fundamental filed a proxy
statement asking shareholders not to approve Tocqueville
and to replace the mutual fund's two remaining
independent directors.
After a lengthy proxy battle, shareholders approved
Tocqueville as the mutual fund's new investment adviser.
That was not, however, the end of the saga. A secondary
dispute subsequently arose between the mutual fund's
new board and Tocqueville over restricting market timers
from moving in and out of the fund. Late in 1998, this
dispute came to a head when the board fired Tocqueville
and approved an interim investment advisory agreement
with Cornerstone Equity Advisors, Inc. ("Cornerstone"). At
12 An inverse floater or inverse floating rate note is "a variable rate
security whose coupon rate increases as a benchmark interest rate
declines." Campbell R. Harvey's Hypertextual Finance Glossary (visited
June 30, 1999) <http:www.duke.edu/-charvey/Classes/wpg/bfglosi.htm>.
6
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a special meeting on March 12, 1999 shareholders
approved an investment advisory agreement with
Cornerstone. The fund is now known as the Cornerstone
New York Muni Fund. 13
Yacktman. The Yacktman situation is yet another that
involved a dispute between the investment adviser and the
mutual fund's independent directors.' 4 In this instance,
the independent directors had questioned the adviser with
respect to an apparent deviation in investment technique,
the appropriate use of derivatives, violations by certain
investment advisory employees of the mutual fund's Code
of Ethics, the management of the fund's portfolios by
individuals other than those named in the prospectus and
the depth and experience of investment management
personnel employed by the investment adviser. In
addition, the independent directors expressed substantial
concern that the mutual fund's investment performance
had been very disappointing.
In response, the investment adviser sent a letter to the
independent directors stating that, if the independent
directors did not resign, a proxy statement would be filed
seeking their replacement. The letter threatened personal
financial consequences for the independent directors if
13 On October 8, 1998, the mutual fund and Cornerstone filed an
application for an order permitting the implementation, without
shareholder approval, of a new investment advisory agreement between
the fund and Cornerstone until the agreement could be approved or
disapproved by shareholders for a period of 120 days after such order is
issued. Fundamental Funds, Inc., et al, Investment Company Act
Release No. 23,527, 63 Fed. Reg. 63,515 (Nov. 6, 1998). The fund filed a
preliminary proxy statement on December 11, 1998 soliciting
shareholder votes to approve or disapprove the Cornerstone agreement
and to consider ratification of the payment of advisory fees by the fund
to Cornerstone from November 30, 1998 through the date of the
meeting. In response, Fundamental filed a preliminary proxy statement
on January 22, 1999 seeking to cause a shareholders meeting to be
held and soliciting proxies to vote on, among other things, the
Cornerstone agreement. According to a prospectus supplement for the
mutual fund dated March 16, 1999, the agreement was approved by
shareholders on March 12, 1999.
14 Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz served as counsel to the fund
during portions of this dispute.
7
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they contested the proxy. The independent directors
refused to resign. The president of the investment adviser
(who was also the president of the mutual fund) then
called a special meeting of shareholders to remove the
independent directors and replace them with a slate of
directors chosen by the adviser. The investment adviser
also filed a preliminary proxy statement with the
Commission.
The board revoked the call of the meeting and removed
the president from office. The independent directors sent a
letter to the Commission seeking intervention to stop the
solicitation of proxies by the investment adviser. 15 In this
letter, the independent directors stated that they had
attempted to fulfill their responsibilities as "watchdogs for
the shareholders" by expressing their concerns. The
independent directors expressed the view that the
adviser's actions constituted an attempt to control the
fund's independent directors. In addition, the independent
directors stated that they believed the investment adviser's
actions constituted a breach of the adviser's fiduciary duty
to the fund in violation of section 36(a) of the Investment
Company Act, 16 and that, if allowed to stand, the
investment adviser's actions would have a chilling effect
upon independent directors of investment companies
throughout the industry.
The investment adviser then sued the mutual fund and
the independent directors in Maryland state court seeking
to force the shareholders meeting to be held and, based
upon section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act, 17 to
prohibit the fund from spending its own assets to solicit
proxies for its own meeting. The state court judge, among
other things, issued a temporary restraining order ('TRO")
prohibiting the mutual fund from spending its own assets
"5Letter from Jon D. Carlson, Thomas R. Hanson, Stanislaw
Maliszewski and Stephen E. Upton, Independent Directors, The
Yacktman Funds to Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm'n (Sep. 25, 1998) (on file with author).
16 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1998).
17 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1998).
8
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to counter the investment adviser's proxy solicitation. The
Commission staff issued a letter that called into question
the judge's ruling, saying that such a ruling could severely
undermine the ability of independent directors to perform
their duties under the Investment Company Act.
18 The
fund immediately removed the case to federal court, and
the federal district court judge vacated this portion of the
TRO; thus, allowing the mutual fund to finance its own
counter-solicitation.
At the shareholders meeting, Yacktman obtained
enough votes to remove the independent directors.19 This
vote, however, did not reflect the fact that the holders of
approximately 64% of the mutual fund's shares had "voted
with their feet" by redeeming their investments in the
fund.20
2. The Commission versus the Independent Directors:
Parnassus and Community Bankers
Parnassus. The independent directors of the Parnassus
Fund found themselves in a battle with the Commission
regarding the pricing of the mutual fund's shares. The
fund owned a position in a thinly-traded stock of a
California maker of supermarket refrigeration systems.
The company filed for bankruptcy protection and
subsequently was delisted from NASDAQ. After it was
18 Letter from Jacob H. Stillman, Associate General Counsel, U.S. Sec.
and Exch. Comm'n, and Douglas J. Scheidt, Associate Director and Chief
Counsel, Div. of Inv. Management, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Commission, to
Richard Teigen, et a. (Oct. 16, 1998) (on file with author) (questioning
whether the acts alleged by the plaintiff adviser constitute a violation of
section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act and rule 17d- I thereunder,
17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(1998)).
19 Yacktman's proposal to remove the independent directors was
favored by the holders of 21,394,079 shares of the funds, 51.2% of the
shares eligible to vote. The vote required for the removal of directors was
a majority of the shares eligible to vote.20See Yacktman Funds press release, Yacktman Wins Vote, Loses
Shareholders (Dec. 3, 1998) (on file with author). The Funds' shares
decreased from 81 million shares ($1.14 billion in assets) on January 1,
1998, to 29 million shares ($0.4 billion in assets) on November 24,
1998, the date of the shareholders meeting. Id
9
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delisted, the mutual fund continued to value the stock at$0.34 per share, although it traded down to $0.03 per
share in the "pink sheets."2' The Commission brought an
enforcement action against Parnassus Investments for
overstating the fund's net asset value and against the
independent directors for aiding and abetting this
violation. The Commission claimed that the independent
directors "ignored or failed to give adequate consideration"
to relevant factors necessary for making pricing decisions.
In late 1998, the Comm-ission issued a cease and desist
order against the independent directors and ordered them
each to pay $5,000 in civil penalties.22
Community Bankers. The Community Bankers Mutual
Fund consisted of a single series, the U.S. Government
Money Market Fund. The fund was a money market fund
that valued its assets using the amortized cost method. As
a result of having a substantial percentage (about 27.5%)
of its assets invested in certain structured notes that
declined in value during mid-1994 because of rising
interest rates, the money market fund failed to maintain a$1.00 net asset value per share.23 The structured notes
became illiquid when many of the market makers
considerably lowered their bids for the notes or
discontinued making a market in them. As a result, the
market value of the structured notes and the fund's
portfolio decreased significantly.
After this decline in value, the board amended the
money market fund's pricing procedures to allow the use
21 The "pink sheets" are a printed quotation medium published by the
National Quotation Bureau, Inc. See Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation
D, Securities Act Release No. 7541, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,168 (May 21, 1998).Securities offered through this medium are "characterized by thin
capitalization, low share prices, and little or no analyst coverage" (Le.,
"microcap" companies). Id.
22 Parnassus Investments, et al., Investment Advisers Act Release No.
1634, SEC Dkt. 1757 (May 28, 1997); Initial Decisions Release No. 131(Sept. 3, 1998).23 After the fund was liquidated, the total loss to shareholders was
approximately $2.5 million, before the recovery of additional funds in
the settlement of a private lawsuit brought by some of the investors in
the fund.
10
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of fair value pricing as well as market quotations. Use of
fair value shadow pricing permitted the board to conclude
that the amortized cost method continued to fairly reflect
the fund's market-based net asset value per share.24 After
fair value pricing had been in use for a substantial length
of time without any recovery in the market quotations for
the structured notes, the board was informed by the fund's
subadviser that the market value of the notes would not
likely revert to par until they reached final maturity, which
was years away. Nevertheless, the board continued to use
fair value pricing. The Commission claimed that prior to
that time, and certainly afterwards, the independent
directors should have known that the continued use of the
money market fund's fair value shadow pricing
methodology was inappropriate.
The Commission instituted an enforcement action
against, among others, the three independent directors of
the money market fund. The independent directors were
charged with willfully violating section 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)
of the Investment Company Act, willfully aiding and
abetting and causing a violation of rule 22c-2 under
section 22(c) of the Act and willfully violating section 36(b)
of the Act.251n January 1999, the Commission issued a
cease and desist order against the independent directors
and ordered them each to pay $5,000 in civil penalties.26
24 Shadow pricing using market quotations would have caused the
board to conclude that the amortized cost method no longer fairly
reflected the fund's market-based net asset value per share, which
would have required the board to mark the securities to market
pursuant to rule 22c-I under the Investment Company Act. 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.22c-l(a) (1998).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-17(a)(2) and 80a-17(a)(3) (1998), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.22c-2 (1998), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1998).26 John E. Backlund, 68 SEC Dkt. 2663 (Jan. 11, 1999).
11
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3. Shareholders versus the Independent Directors:
Strougo, et al.
A series of shareholder lawsuits has questioned the
independence of directors who sit on multiple boards
within the same fund complex. Suits have been brought
against independent directors serving on boards of mutual
funds and closed-end funds managed by Scudder Kemper,
BEA, T. Rowe Price, Blackrock, Prudential and Fidelity.
This wave of suits began early in 1997 when Robert
Strougo, a shareholder of Scudder's Brazil Fund, sued,
among others, the four independent directors of the
closed-end fund in connection with a rights offering. 27
Three of the four independent directors served on the
boards of other funds managed by Scudder. Several of
Strougo's claims were allowed to go forward against the
three independent directors who served on multiple
boards, including breach of fiduciary duty claims under
Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act and
under Maryland law and a control person liability claim
under Section 48 of the Investment Company Act. 28 Due to
the significant policy issues involved in the case, the
Investment Company Institute ("ICI") was granted the
right to participate amicus curiae. The proceedings were
then stayed for a period of time to allow a special litigation
committee of the board to determine whether continued
prosecution of the suit was in the best interests of the
closed-end fund and its shareholders. Based upon the
special litigation committee's extensive investigation and
conclusion that continuation of the suit was not in the
best interests of the fund and its shareholders, the suit
was ultimately dismissed, but only after a lengthy and
expensive court battle.29
27 See Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
28 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-35(a) and 80a-47 (1998).29 On May 12, 1998, the Governor of Maryland signed into law
legislation that affirms for purposes of Maryland corporation law that
the Investment Company Act of 1940 governs the determination of
whether a director of an investment company is an interested person.
12
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In the BEA, T. Rowe Price, Blackrock, Prudential and
Fidelity suits, plaintiffs claimed that certain funds'
investment advisory contracts should be deemed invalid
on the basis that the independent directors who approved
such contracts sit on multiple boards within the same
fund complex and, therefore, are beholden to the
investment adviser. Charging that such directors are not
truly independent, the suits allege that the investment
advisers received fees pursuant to a "sweetheart contract",
entitling shareholders to recover those fees on behalf of the
fund on the grounds of breach of fiduciary duty by the
directors. In several of the suits the original complaints
were dismissed. However, amended complaints have been
filed.
4. The Press and John Bogle versus
the Independent Directors
Independent directors also have come under attack by
the press, which has portrayed independent directors as
mere props - individuals willing to rubber stamp any
proposal by the investment adviser, including an increase
in advisory fees or the imposition of fees pursuant to plans
adopted under Investment Company Act rule 12b- 1
(hereinafter "12b- 1 fees" and "12b- I plans"). 30 To support
the criticism some articles have cited a study by
Morningstar 31 examining the relationship between the
For a fuller discussion of the events in Maryland, see James J. Hanks,
Jr., Straightening Out Strougo: The Maryland Legislative Response to
Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 1 VILL. J. L. & INV. MGMT. 21
(1999).
30 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (1998). See, e.g., Steve Bailey & Steve Syre,
Mutual Fund Firms Work to Protect Director System: Seek to Make
Challenges By Shareholders More Difficult, Boston Globe, Dec. 4, 1998.
at E6; Mary Beth Grover & Jason Zweig, Squeak, Squeak: Mutual Fund
Directors are Supposed to be the Fierce Watchdogs Who Guard the
Interests of Shareholders, Forbes, May 22, 1995, at 258. But see
Thomas D. Lauricella, Lipper Says Fund Fees Reasonable, Critics
Unswayed, The Daily Record (Baltimore, MD), Sept. 26, 1997, at 5.
31 MORNINGSTAR STUDY, supra note 2.
13
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level of directors' fees and shareholder expenses.3 2 (Other,
more favorable, studies of shareholder expenses by LipperAnalytical Services33 and the ICI34 have also received
coverage).3 5 Finally, comments by John C. Bogle,
Chairman of the Vanguard Group,36 have added fuel to
the fire.
The MORNINGSTAR STUDY, in particular, is critical of the
role of independent directors in approving investment
advisory contracts and finds a correlation between thelevel of directors' fees and shareholder expenses. The
MORNINGSTAR STUDY looked at director compensation and
shareholder expenses at the 82 largest fund families.
According to the MORNINGSTAR STUDY, it reveals a
"disturbing pattern" at these fund families, and finds a
"link" between directors' fees and shareholder expenses.3 7
This "raises serious questions about the role independent[directors] play in protecting shareholders." Although
admitting that, in dollar terms, the difference in director
compensation between high-cost and low-cost fund
32 See, e.g., Carole Gould. Are Well-Paid Trustees Putting Shareholders
First?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1996, at 5; Russ Wiles, Study RaisesQuestions About the Vigilance of the Family Watchdog, LA Times, Oct. 6,
1996, at D5.
33 Lipper Analytical Services, Inc., The Third White Paper: Are MutualFutnd Fees Reasonable? (Sept. 1997) (hereinafter Lipper Study).34John D. Rea & Brian K. Reid, Investment Company InstitutePerspective, Trends in the Ownership Cost of Equity Mutual Funds, (Nov.1998) (hereinafter the ICI Study).3 5 See, e.g., Russ Wiles, Are Expenses Justfted, or Just PlainExcessive, LA Times, Nov. 9, 1997, at D3 (reporting on the key points ofthe Lipper Study); Bill Barnhart, The Fee Fracas: A Bit of Light With theHeat, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 12, 1997, at 3 (providing statistics andcomments from the Lipper Study); Werner Renberg, Cost of OwningMoney Market and Bond Funds Drops Greatly, Star-Tribune(Minneapolis 
- St. Paul), Mar. 21, 1999, at 2D (highlighting the various
components of the ICI Study).
36 John C. Bogle, Whose Board, Voices, Bloomberg Personal Finance,December 1997. For a discussion of the Bogle article, see text
accompanying note 43, infra.
37 For example, the MORNINGSTAR STUDY concluded that fund familiesthat pay their directors $100,000 per year or more charge an average of15 basis points more for domestic equity funds, not including 12b-Ifees, than do families that pay their directors less than $25,000 peryear. See MORNINGSTAR STUDY, supra note 2.
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families has little effect on shareholders, the Morningstar
Study argues that it reveals a "potentially chilling conflict
of interest" on the part of independent directors.
In contrast in 1997, Lipper Analytical Services
conducted a study of mutual fund fees and concluded that
such fees are reasonable. 38 While new funds, on balance,
are charging higher fees, the composition of those funds
has changed, according to the Lipper Study. The Lipper
Study cites a proliferation of new international bond and
stock mutual funds, which are inherently more expensive
to run, as the reason for increased costs. The Lipper Study
also argues that the higher fees on new mutual funds
reflects the higher cost of doing business in today's mutual
fund environment, with its emphasis on marketing and
increased customer service.
Similarly, the ICI conducted a study in 1998 that
examined trends in the ownership cost of equity mutual
funds.39 The ICI Study examines the level and trend in
mutual fund fees and expenses using "total shareholder
cost" (calculated to measure the cost that an investor
would expect to incur in purchasing and holding mutual
fund shares).40 The ICI Study, which bases its conclusions
upon the sales-weighted average of shareholder cost ratios
for individual equity funds, determines that the total
shareholder cost for equity funds decreased by more than
one-third between 1980 and 1997.41 The ICI Study
attributes this decrease to lower distribution costs (sales
loads and 12b-1 fees) and increased investment in lower-
cost equity funds, and finds economies of scale to exist
among individual equity funds.
38 Lipper Study, supra note 33.
39 ICI Study, supra note 34.
40 Id. The fees and expenses comprising total shareholder cost include
fund operating expenses, 12b- 1 fees and sales loads, similar to the fees
and expense information required by the Commission in mutual fund
prospectuses. Id.
41 Id. The ICI Study also found a decrease in total shareholder cost
based upon the simple average, asset-weighted average, and median of
the operating expense ratios for such funds. The ICI Study, supra
note 34.
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Notwithstanding this debate on the levels and
reasonableness of fees, the popular perception in the
media is that independent directors have a duty to keep
fees as low as possible and that they have failed in fulfilling
that role. Indeed, in a recent article discussing the
Commission's then upcoming Roundtable on the Role of
Independent Investment Company Directors, the Wall
Street Journal claimed that: "While ostensibly there to
defend fund holders' interests, including keeping fund
expenses as low as possible, [independent directors] rarely
do kick up a fuss, and expenses charged to investors have
kept rising industry-wide despite vast new economies of
scale. " 42
Perhaps the most scathing criticism of independent
directors, however, comes from an industry insider, John
C. Bogle, Chairman of the Vanguard Group, 43 who has
stated that:
Mutual fund directors generally seem to operate under
a... mission statement, which might read something
like this: 'The mission of the Board is to serve as a
watchdog over the management company that controls
and operates every aspect of the Fund's affairs and to
approve contracts with the company that provide fees
sufficient to ensure its growth and profitability. The
Board may consider the economic value of the returns
achieved for the Fund's shareholders relative to its peers
and to unmanaged market indexes, but may accept a
level of long-term value that fails to meet either
standard."...
[Such a mission statement] shows a limited
commitment to the principal of putting shareholders
first. It suggests that while a fund's directors may serve
the economic interests of the shareholders, they will also
serve the economic interests of the fund's management
42 Charles Gasparino & Pui-Wing Tam, Mutual Fund Boards: No
Comfort? SEC to Host a Round Table Hoping to Prod Fund Directors Into
Doing More for Investors, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1999, at C1.
43See Bogle, supra note 36.
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company. As a result, whether fund shareholders are
well served or ill served, managers, without significant
exception, lose neither their jobs nor their contracts. The
balance of interests tilts toward the management
company.... 44
C. PROPOSALS TO REPLACE
THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
1. The UIF Approach
Disenchantment with the present investment company
governance structure has led some to endorse radically
simplified governance arrangements such as the unitary
investment fund ("UIF"). Originally proposed in 1980,45 the
UIF is an alternative form of open-end management
44 Compare, however, the comments from an ICI publication that cites
the many benefits of the independent director governance structure and
the high standards by which independent directors act:
Investors receive many other benefits by investing in mutual funds,
including strong legal protections and full disclosure. In addition,
shareholders gain an extra layer of protection because each mutual
fund has a board of directors looking out for shareholders'
interests.... Independent directors are often prominent individuals
with diverse backgrounds in business, government or academia,
often with distinguished careers and experience. Such individuals are
well-suited for the position because they can be expected to exercise
independent business judgment on behalf of the fund and its
shareholders, with integrity and diligence.... Because mutual fund
directors are, in essence looking out for shareholders' money, the law
holds directors to a very high standard of behavior in carrying out
their responsibilities. They must act with the same degree of care and
skill that a reasonably prudent person would use in the same
situation or in connection with his or her own money....
Each director bears a tremendous responsibility to represent the
best interests of shareholders. This responsibility constitutes both a
crucial and unique role for mutual fund directors in the protection of
consumers.
In a 1992 report, the SEC concluded: "The oversight function
performed by investment company boards of directors, especially the
'watchdog' function performed by the independent directors, has
served investors well, at minimal cost."
Investment Company Institute, Undlerstanding the Role of Mutual Fund
Directors, ICI Investor Awareness Series, Feb. 1999 (visited May 25,
1999) <http: //www.ici.org/aboutfunds/essentialinfo.html>.
45 Stephen K. West, Address at the General Meeting of the Investment
Company Institute (May 1, 1980).
17
Sturms: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Independent Directors: Is the Syst
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
120 VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
investment company whose structure is predicated on the
belief that an investment company is a proprietary
product, more suited to a contractual arrangement than to
corporate democracy. Its advocates claim that the UIF's
simplified governance and fee arrangements would be
more flexible for the investment adviser and more
comprehensible to investors.
As proposed in 1980, the UIF would have the following
key features.
(1) The UIF would be an optional form of investment
company, similar in form to a trust, with a corporate
trustee (the sponsor/manager), a trust indenture
(which would spell out fundamental investment
policies and the management fee) and investors
holding interests in the trust.
(2) A single management fee would cover all expenses,
except for extraordinary expenses and shareholder
account services. The fee would be subject to a
statutory maximum, which the Commission could
increase by rulemaking. No limit would be placed on
the percentage of the fee that could be used for
distribution expenses.
(3) The UIF would have no board of directors or
shareholder voting, nor would section 36(b) of the
Investment Company Act apply. 46
(4) During an initial period (perhaps five years) the
indenture could not be amended without an
exemptive order from the Commission. Thereafter,
the sponsor could amend the indenture at any time
upon adequate notice to investors. Shareholders
objecting to a change could redeem.
(5) The UIF either would be no-load or would refund the
sales charge upon redemption in most situations.
(6) All prohibitions under section 17 of the Investment
Company Act concerning transactions with affiliates
46 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1998).
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would apply.47 Because there would be no board of
directors to prevent the sponsor's brokerage affiliate
from charging excessive commissions to a UIF,
agency transactions with affiliates, for example,
currently allowed under section 17(e) of the
Investment Company Act 48 would be prohibited.
(7) The UIF could not engage in activities that rely on
rules or exemptive orders conditioned on director
oversight unless mechanical rules or individual
exemptive orders were substituted for such
oversight.
2. Proposed Variations of the UIF Approach
Since the time of the original proposal, a number of
variations have been suggested. For example, some
advocates of the UIF take the position that even UIF
shareholders should have voting rights. These
commentators believe that a UIF sponsor should be able to
recover distribution costs through front-end and
contingent deferred sales charges, as well as through the
asset-based fee paid by the UIF. Since a UIF would have no
board of directors to review proposed fee increases and
investment policy changes on behalf of shareholders, these
commentators would require the sponsor to obtain
shareholder approval of any such changes. Others, citing
investor protection concerns, have recommended that any
UIF structure retain independent directors to exercise
oversight over the affairs of the company. Moreover,
although the original proposal included a statutory
maximum fee that the Commission could increase through
rulemaking, most pro-UIF commentators would not retain
this provision. Some UIF proponents, however, would
continue to require that fee increases be subject to
shareholder approval. 49
11 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1998).
48 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1998).
49See Div. OF INV. MANAGEMENT, U.S. SEC. AND ExCH. COMM'N,
PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY
REGULATION, 278-79 (1992) (listing six shareholder voting requirements
19
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One modified version of the original UIF proposal that
has evolved since 1980 has the following main provisions:
(1) it eliminates the board of directors; (2) it retains section
36(b)-type liability; and (3) it prohibits section 17-type
transactions with affiliates. 50 The rest of the terms and
provisions would be contractual in nature, operating, in
effect, similarly to section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) entities 51 (or so-
called "hedge funds"), but in a more regulated
environment.
3. Projected Advantages of the U1ZF Approach
Supporters of the UIF approach argue that not only is it
more intellectually honest than the corporate governance
model under the Investment Company Act, it also provides
greater flexibility to investment advisers in developing and
operating products. Investors make decisions based on the
anticipated performance of a product. The thrust of the
UIF approach is to provide an investor with full
information concerning a product, enabling the investor to
make rational investment decisions between competing
products. At the same time, the UIF model recognizes the
inherent conflict between shareholders and investment
advisers, retaining some fundamental section 17-type
that should be retained under the Investment Company Act)
(hereinafter 1992 Commission Report).
50 Under the modified UIF approach, rule 17e-1, rule 17a-7 and other
similar types of transactions would be permitted, subject to the
substantive requirements of such rules. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.17e-1 and
270.17a-7 (1998).
51 Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act excludes from the
definition of an investment company, as defined under section 3(a)(1) of
the Act, "[any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-
term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred
persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to
make a public offering of its securities". 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(a)(1) and
80a-3(c)(1) (1998).
Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act excludes from the
definition of an investment company, as defined under section 3(a)(l) of
the Act, "[any issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned
exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities,
are qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does not at the
time propose to make a public offering of such securities". 15 U.S.C. §§
80a-3(a)(1) and 80a-3(c)(7) (1998).
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provisions of the Investment Company Act (similar to those
imposed on adviser/client relationships directly by the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940). Underlying the UIF
model is a greater faith in the market than that embodied
in the current corporate governance model. The current
model was developed in the late 1930's during the Great
Depression when faith in the market was at an all time
low. The current corporate governance structure was
designed to address the problems of an industry in its
infancy. However, argue UIF supporters, the investment
company industry has matured, and the existing
corporate governance structure is archaic. Investors have
many more choices of investment advisers, have greater
access to information about investment companies and
are generally more sophisticated.
4. Criticisms of the [IF Approach
Aside from arguing that the current corporate
governance system works, critics of the UIF approach have
a number of specific criticisms. First, they argue that the
UIF proposal offers no practical alternatives for board
oversight in areas that do not involve fees.52 Some
proponents of the UIF approach have argued that, in most
cases, matters involving directors could be detailed in the
trust indenture (for example, a money market fund's
amortized cost procedures establishing the guidelines an
investment manager must follow could be spelled out in
the indenture agreement without board review). Critics,
however, argue that no UIF proponent has provided any
analysis of how various rules that look to directors could
be implemented and modified to operate without directors.
One alternative to the board that is cited by UIF supporters
would substitute a trustee or custodian, similar to a
52 For example, the independent directors select the fund's
independent public accountants, determine annually whether
participation in joint liability insurance policies is in the best interests
of the fund, and review and approve fidelity bonds. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-31 and 17 C.F.R. § 270.17g-l(d)(1998).
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"depositary" used in Europe.53 The trustee or custodian
would oversee all fund operations. However, critics argue
that such an approach is unlikely to create any cost
savings, since such a trustee or custodian would
presumably insist on the same level of compensation as a
board. In addition, there is no reason why a trustee or
custodian would be significantly better than independent
directors. Another alternative would be to substitute
greater oversight and examination by the Commission.
However, critics believe such a suggestion to be
unrealistic, given budgetary constraints.
Second, critics fear that unchecked market competition
under the UIF approach would create incentives for an
investment adviser to cut corners on basic services to a
mutual fund to meet competitive pressures. Even in the
absence of competitive pressures, an adviser might
nevertheless be tempted to cut comers on basic services to
bolster its own profitability. Without a third party to
oversee the level of services to a mutual fund, critics argue
that investors would be left to their own devices, without
the necessary expertise, information and ability to assess
the quality of these services.
53 See European Council Directive of 20 December, 1985, on the
Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions
Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities, Council Directive 85/611, 1985 O.J. (L375) 3.
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II. THE SYSTEM CREAKS
The majority of commentators, while occasionally
expressing some frustration with the current system of
investment company governance, believe that independent
directors can and do provide an important level of investor
protection. Thus, they have proposed that the current
system should have various structural amendments,
rather than be scrapped. In particular, they advocate
reforms to enhance the effectiveness of independent
directors. Such reforms are intended to maintain the basic
overall corporate governance structure under the belief
that investment company governance works best with
independent directors acting in their traditional role as
"watchdogs" for shareholders.5 4 In addition, they seek to
enhance the independence of independent directors and to
provide them with additional tools to fulfill their role.
A. THE 1992 COMMISSION REPORT
In "Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment
Company Regulation", 55 a 1992 report by the Commission
staff examining, among other things, the current
governance requirements of the Investment Company Act
as they relate to the role of directors and the various
criticisms of those requirements, the staff concluded that
the corporate regulatory structure embodied in the
Investment Company Act is fundamentally sound.
Nevertheless, the 1992 Commission Report acknowledged
that the current system could be improved; and it
recommended, among other things, structural changes to
enhance the independence of fund boards. First, the
Report recommended that Section 10(a) of the Investment
54 See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1979). In Burks,
the Court held that "the structure and purpose of the I[nvestment]
Clompanyl A[ct] indicate that Congress entrusted to the independent
directors of investment companies, exercising the authority granted to
them by state, the primary responsibility for looking after the interests
of the funds' shareholders". Id.
5 See note 49, supra.
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Company Act5 6 be amended to require that more than fifty
percent (50%) of directors of investment company boards
be independent. Second, the Report recommended that
section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act be further
amended to require, as is now the case for mutual funds
that have adopted 12b-I plans, that independent directors
be self-nominating. Finally, the Report recommended that
the independent directors be given independent authority
to terminate investment advisory contracts (unlike current
law which only allows the full board or the shareholders to
take such action).
Two of these three recommendations from the 1992
Commission Report - having a majority of independent
directors and requiring that independent directors be self-
nominating - were recently identified by Commission
Chairman Arthur Levitt as two of the four "concrete
measures which will form the cornerstone of a major
Commission initiative to improve mutual fund
governance." 57 All three have been almost universally
seconded by the investment company industry, and
should be considered "no-brainers".
Chairman Levitt's third concrete proposal - requiring
independent directors to have counsel separate from
counsel for the investment adviser - was considered by
the Commission staff when preparing the 1992
Commission Report and rejected. The Report argued that,
while independent counsel would be beneficial to
independent directors and in some circumstances might
be necessary for a board to properly perform its
responsibilities under the Investment Company Act,
independent directors are, in many situations, capable of
functioning without such assistance. The Report
56 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1998).
57 See Chairman Arthur Levitt, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n., Keeping
Faith with the Shareholder Interest: Strengthening the Role of
Independent Directors of Mutual Funds, Remarks at the Mutual Funds
and Investment Management Conference, Palm Springs, CA, Mar. 20,
1999 (last modified Mar. 22, 1999) < http:// www.sec.gov / news /
speeches / spch259.htm >, (hereinafter Levitt Speech).
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concluded that the costs of requiring counsel for the
independent directors was not justified in all cases.
Despite the conclusion of the 1992 Commission Report,
as a practical matter, the legal complexities applicable to
investment companies and their independent directors
routinely result in the retention of legal counsel. Moreover,
the courts and the Commission have made it clear that
access to expert legal advice is a key factor in determining
whether directors have satisfied their fiduciary duties
under the Investment Company Act. For example, courts58
and the Commission5 9 have cited access to legal counsel as
a factor in deciding whether directors have satisfied their
fiduciary duties under sections 15 and 36 of the
Investment Company Act6° when adopting or renewing
advisory contracts, and when adopting or renewing 12b- 1
plans. Accordingly, legal observers have argued, as the
Chairman suggested, that the Act should codify the
industry "best practice" and require that independent
directors have separate counsel.61
58 See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 428 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding that although independent directors received the advice of
interested legal counsel, such advice was accurate and therefore does
not "vitiate the reasonableness of the [independent director's]
judgment". But see Fogel v. Chestnut, 533 F.2d 731, 749-50 (2d Cir.
1975) (finding that if disinterested legal counsel had been provided to
independent directors in the performance of their duties disposition of
case would be different); Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset
Management. Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) affd 694
F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that approval of advisory contact by
trustees of the fund will be weighted heavily in deciding whether
compensation paid to adviser was reasonable since trustees were
represented by independent counsel in the discussions concerning the
contract).
59 See Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment
Company Act Release No. 11,414, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 82,678, at 83,722 (Nov. 7, 1980) (adopting Rule 12b-I and
listing as a factor for a board in approving or renewing a distribution
plan the need for independent counsel).
60 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15 and 80a-35 (1998), 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1
(1998).
61 See, e.g., letter from Stanley M. Grossman and Bruce G. Stumpf,
Pomerantz Levy Haudek Block & Grossman to Mr. George A.
Fitzsimmons, Secretary, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n. (Apr. 15, 1983)
(on file with author); See also letter from Francis X. Cain to Jonathan G.
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There are a number of structures that provide for
counsel to the independent directors separate from
counsel to the investment adviser. In one model, the
independent directors, the investment company and the
investment adviser each retain their own separate counsel.
This is the ultimate degree of separateness. In a second
model, one counsel represents the investment company
and the investment adviser, while the independent
directors retain their own separate counsel. This model is
premised on the notion that the mutual fund and the
adviser are essentially synonymous and, therefore, one
counsel represents those parties while another counsel
represents the independent directors. In a third model,
one counsel represents the investment company and the
independent directors and another counsel represents the
investment adviser. This model is premised on the belief
that the mutual fund and the independent directors are
essentially synonymous, and that any conflict is with the
adviser, which retains its own counsel. Although any of the
three models can, depending upon the circumstances,
achieve the goal of giving the independent directors
adequate and appropriate counsel, the type of structure
employed can affect the access to information and the
influence that the independent directors have over fund
matters. This author believes the third model to be the
most efficient and logically consistent with the goals of the
Investment Company Act.62 I have yet to see an instance
where the interests of the independent directors and the
fund shareholders were not aligned, yet I have seen many
Katz, Secretary, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n. (Sept. 17, 1990) (on file
with author).
62 Others have argued that rather than requiring a specific structure,
a majority of the independent directors should determine what
structure best serves the interests of fund shareholders in a particular
fund organization, and determine who should be selected. This would
place the selection of counsel to the fund and, if determined
appropriate, separate counsel for the independent directors, on a par
with the selection of independent public accountants for the fund,
which must be approved by a majority of the independent directors. See
Section 32(a)(1) of the Investment Company Act, which requires that an
investment company's selection of accountant be approved by a
majority of the independent directors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31(a)(1) (1998).
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instances in which counsel representing only the
independent directors has less access to information,
which, dilutes or even blocks the information flow to the
independent directors. As the Fund Director's Guidebook of
the American Bar Association notes:
Whether to retain separate counsel for the independent
directors is dependent on a number of factors. Counsel
with no material relationship with the investment
adviser or its affiliates frequently acts both as fund
counsel and counsel for the independent directors. In
other cases, the relationship of fund counsel to
management warrants having the directors retain
separate counsel. The size and complexity of a fund
group may also warrant retaining separate counsel who
can focus on the needs of the independent directors. In
lieu of regular, separate counsel, the board might
consider independent counsel on an ad hoc basis with
respect to specific matters. The decision to retain
separate counsel may be a question of economics as
smaller fund groups may not have the asset base to
afford regular separate representation. There is no
"bright line" test, but generally it is important that the
independent directors have ready access to counsel who
views the board and the fund, not the adviser, as the
client. (emphasis added)63
B. ADDITIONAL REGULATORY/
LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
Some commentators have argued that the structural
reforms discussed in the 1992 Commission Report do not
go far enough. Rather, they argue that, if the current
corporate governance structure is to be retained, broader
reforms are necessary to ensure that independent
directors have the tools to fulfill their role.
63 See Task Force on the Fund Director's Guidebook, Fund Director's
Guidebook, 52 Bus. Law. 229 (1996).
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Chairman Levitt's fourth concrete measure would
require providing mutual fund shareholders with "more
specific information on which to judge the independence of
their funds' directors." The Chairman stated that he would
like to see shareholders get more information about
directors. I know that there are directors who may
technically be considered to be independent, but who
have had business or other relationships with
management. Shareholders should know that.
Shareholders should also know whether the directors'
interests are in line with their own interests. They
should know whether and how much the directors have
invested in the funds they oversee.6
To further bolster the independence of independent
directors, perhaps the Investment Company Act should
prohibit an investment adviser (or an affiliate of the
investment adviser) from seeking to remove or replace
independent directors. The notion is that if independent
directors are charged with watching over the investment
adviser, the system is fundamentally flawed if the adviser
can have them removed when the oversight cuts too close
to home. To deal with the exception to every rule (for
example, a board consisting of "drunken sailors"), the Act
could permit an investment adviser to seek to remove or
replace independent directors upon a showing to the
Commission of good cause. Presumably, the Commission
would grant such an order if the adviser could show that
the independent directors were in breach of their fiduciary
duties to the investment company. 65 This would insulate
independent directors from the threat of removal from
office through economic or other coercion if, in fulfilling
their duties, they disagreed with the investment adviser.
64 Levitt Speech, supra note 57.
65 It is questionable whether this exception is necessary since the
Commission, presumably upon a showing of cause, could initiate
removal of the directors under section 36(a) of the Investment Company
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a)(1) (1998).
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It has also been proposed by a former independent
director of the Yacktman Funds6 6 that the Investment
Company Act be amended to permit an investment
company board of directors (or even the independent
directors alone) to replace the investment adviser without
requiring shareholder approval. Currently, a board can
terminate an adviser and hire a new adviser on an interim
basis; but ultimately the new investment adviser must be
approved by shareholders. 67 As evidenced by the Navellier,
Fundamental and Yacktman cases, the practical ability of
a board to replace an adviser is limited, which, of course,
gives the board little negotiating strength and makes it
unlikely that a successor investment adviser would be
willing to step in on an interim basis. If the directors had
the authority to permanently hire a new investment
adviser without shareholder approval, the board would be
able to fire an adviser and replace it without either the
unpleasant prospect of leaving the mutual fund without an
adviser or the threat of facing a well-financed proxy battle
against the adviser for control of the mutual fund. In
6 See comments of Stanislaw Maliszewski in Lori Pizzani, Forum on
Mutual Fund Governance Issues, MUTUAL FUND MARKET NEWS, Feb. 22,
1999, at 36, 38. But see criticism of this suggestion by other
participants in the forum, Barry Barbash, Carl Frischling, Paul Haaga
and Don Phillips. Id.
67 Investment Company Act Rule 15a-4. Rule 15a-4 provides:
Notwithstanding Section 15(a) of the Act, a person may act as
investment adviser for an investment company pursuant to a written
contract which has not been approved by a majority of the
outstanding voting securities of such company during the 120-day
period after the termination of an investment advisory contract by an
event (other than an assignment by an investment adviser in
connection with which such investment adviser, or a controlling
person thereof, directly or indirectly receives money or other benefit)
described in paragraph (3) or (4) of Section 15(a) of the Act or by the
failure to renew such contract; provided that:
(a) Such contract has been approved by the investment company's
board of directors, including a majority of the directors who are not
interested persons thereof; and
(b) The compensation to be received under that contract does not
exceed the compensation which would have been received under the
most recent investment advisory contract that had been approved by
the vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities of the
investment company.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-4 (1998).
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addition, other investment advisers might be more willing
to compete for management of a fund's assets if they did
not face the high barrier to entry imposed by the costs of
such a proxy battle or resulting litigation. At the very least,
this proposal could add credibility to a board's threat to
shop the mutual fund's investment advisory contract
when negotiating with the adviser and thereby strengthen
the board's negotiating position.68
A final proposal to strengthen independent directors is a
proposal to rescind a 1980 Commission release69 that still
imposes a number of unnecessary procedural hurdles on
independent directors seeking advancement of legal fees,
particularly in actions brought against the independent
directors by the investment adviser.70 Most investment
6 While this proposal may sound revolutionary and counter to
shareholders' rights, it has been argued that the Commission already
has effectively eliminated the shareholder approval requirement for a
new adviser in all but extreme circumstances. In 1992, the Commission
approved an amendment to NYSE Rule 452 to allow street shares to be
voted in favor of an initial investment advisory agreement as a routine
item. With the recent investment management industry consolidation,
application 'of this Rule has been expanded to approve entirely new
advisory agreements with new advisers. In effect, in most
circumstances, the shareholder approval process has already been
replaced by a lock-step street vote. Exchange Act Release No. 30,697,
51 S.E.C. Docket 688 (May 13, 1992) (approving a NYSE interpretation
of Rule 452 to allow a member organization to give a proxy on the initial
approval of an investment advisory contract if the beneficial holder does
not exercise his right to vote).
69 Indemnification by Investment Companies, Investment Company
Act Release No. 11,330, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 48,444 at 37,352
(Sept. 4, 1980) (hereinafter 1980 Release).
7°Many investment companies maintain joint liability insurance
policies with the investment adviser, and its affiliates, as coinsureds.
Most of those policies, however, traditionally excluded coverage for
disputes between or among insureds, subject to certain exceptions
(such as a derivative claim brought without the assistance or
participation of any insured or a claim where, in the opinion of
independent counsel, failure to bring such claim would result in
liability to such insured). ICI Mutual has recently revised its Directors
and Officers/Errors and Omissions policy to ensure that fund
independent directors may recover for defense costs, settlements and
judgments in bona fide "insured vs. insured" claims otherwise covered
under its policy. Independent directors may wish to consider, in
determining whether to participate in a joint liability insurance policy,
whether there is any possibility of a dispute with the investment adviser
30
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companies, consistent with state law,7 1 have charter or by-
law provisions that provide for indemnification and
advancement of expenses for directors and officers.
Ordinarily, under state law, a director could obtain
advancement of expenses by representing that he did not
engage in disabling conduct and undertaking to pay back
any advancement of expenses if it is determined later that
he engaged in disabling conduct. The 1980 Release,
however, also requires one of the following additional
conditions be met before receiving an advancement of
expenses: (1) the director shall provide a security for his
undertaking; (2) the fund shall be insured against losses
arising by reason of any lawful advances; or (3) a majority
of a quorum of the disinterested, non-party directors of the
fund, or an independent legal counsel in a written opinion,
shall determine, based on a review of readily available
facts (as opposed to a full trial-type inquiry), that there is
reason to believe that the director has not engaged in
disabling conduct. Recently, however, the Commission
staff confirmed that it would be consistent with Section
17(h) of the Investment Company Act 72 for independent
counsel to render an opinion on the advancement of legal
fees to independent directors to afford those directors a
under which they or the fund would likely desire liability insurance
coverage, and, if so, whether the proposed policy would provide such
coverage or whether they should maintain separate insurance policies
or make other appropriate arrangements.
71 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 2-418 (b) & (0 (1998).
Section 2-418(b)(1) of the Maryland General Corporate Law provides
that "[a] corporation may indemnify any director made a party to any
proceeding by reason of service in that capacity...." MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-418 (b)(1).
Section 2-418(fl(1) of the Maryland General Corporate Law provides
that "[rjeasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party to a
proceeding may be paid or reimbursed by the corporation in advance of
the final disposition of the proceeding. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS'NS § 2-418 (f)(1).
72 See 15 U.S.C. 80a-17(h) (1998). Investment Company Act Section
17(h) prohibits contractual provisions that protect a director or officer of
an investment company from liability by reason of willful misfeasance,
bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard of duties as a director
or officer ("disabling conduct"). Id.
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rebuttable presumption that they did not engage in
"disabling conduct. '" 73
The additional requirements imposed by the 1980 Re-
lease on advancement of expenses were intended to estab-
lish a reasonable procedure for determining, prior to an
advance, that indemnification is likely to be available. Giv-
en that requests for advances can be made both by the in-
dependent directors and those who are affiliated with
the investment adviser, the 1980 Release provides reason-
able safeguards against inappropriate overreaching, par-
ticularly by the adviser or its affiliates. 74 In its request for
no-action, however, counsel argued that when indepen-
dent directors, acting in their capacity as directors, make
determinations that they believe are in the best interest of
the mutual fund and its shareholders, such independent
directors should, in essence, be given the benefit of the
doubt and allowed to use fund assets to defend themselves
unless and until it is shown that they have engaged in
disabling conduct. Now that the Commission staff has al-
lowed such a presumption, it may be questioned whether
any of the conditions articulated in the 1980 Release are
necessary for independent directors. Rather than protect-
ing the mutual fund, they may simply serve to make it
more difficult for independent directors to obtain lawful
and appropriate advances of expenses, particularly when
faced with a strike suit or with predatory action from an
investment adviser. Moreover, if independent directors are
not reasonably assured that they can defend themselves
from attack, they may be less willing to confront an adviser
or ask the hard questions.
13 The Yacktman Funds, Inc., SEC No-Action letter, 1998 WL 895653
(Dec. 18, 1998).
74See Steadman Security Corp. v. Steadman Associated Fund,
94,758, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,009 at
94,758 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1982).
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III. THE SYSTEM WORKS
Supporters of the current system argue that the
inherent conflicts presented by externally managed
investment companies make it uniquely appropriate that
independent directors take an active role in their
governance. Shareholders need the protection provided by
independent directors and neither the Commission nor the
market is capable of replacing the board. Indeed, the
investment company industry, under the current
regulatory system, has not experienced the recent abuses
and mismanagement seen in other financial institutions.
A. THE "NUCLEAR THREAT" IS A DETERRENT
Commentators argue that independent directors do
serve as a meaningful counterweight to the entrepreneuri-
al spirit of investment advisers. 75 Indeed, the hoops the
adviser must jump through in order to get board approval
or to meet a board's oversight responsibilities is, in itself, a
valuable exercise. The extensive and ongoing process of
preparing information for independent directors forces the
investment adviser to address and resolve certain issues
that otherwise would not be raised. The process also
increases the chance that problems will be identified at an
earlier stage when they can be more easily solved.
76
In addition, if investment advisers make mistakes,
whether or not such mistakes violate the law, independent
directors are able to exert pressure on advisers to act in
the shareholders' best interests, including full disclosure
of the problem and reimbursement of the mutual fund to
make shareholders whole. 77 Absent pressure from
independent directors, the investment adviser may
attempt to hide such mistakes from shareholders, the
75 See, e.g., Richard M. Phillips, Deregulation Under the Investment
Company Act - A Reevaluation of the Corporate Paraphernalia of
Shareholder Voting and Boards of Directors, 37 Bus. LAW. 903. 910
(1982) (noting that "over the years independent directors of mutual
funds have become increasingly sophisticated and sensitive to their
responsibility to oversee the relationship between the investment
adviser and the fund").
76 1992 SEC Report, supra note 49.
7 7 Id.
33
Sturms: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Independent Directors: Is the Syst
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
136 VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
general public and regulators. In fact, absent third party
oversight, competitive pressures give investment advisers
every incentive to hide such mistakes from the market.
Finally, the mere threat of not approving an investment
advisory contract or removing an adviser may very well
deter advisers from egregious conduct. Even though rarely
used, the "nuclear deterrent" could be the psychological
key to avoiding conflict. In essence, the supporters of the
current system argue that the mere presence of
independent directors imposes a certain discipline on
advisers that cannot be adequately provided by the market
or by regulators. 78
B. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS Do Say "No"
Supporters of the current system note that independent
directors do say "no";79 it is just that the media do not
trumpet this fact or simply do not know the inner workings
of the investment company board room. Moreover, they
point to the recent clashes between independent directors
and mutual funds as examples of why the system works,
not why it is broken. They cite Navellier, Fundamental and
Yacktman as success stories. In those cases, directors
stood up to the investment adviser and alerted sharehold-
ers to potential problems with the adviser. Although in two
of those cases the independent directors were ultimately
unsuccessful in removing and then replacing the adviser,
bringing the issues to the attention of the market enabled
shareholders to vote with their feet. Without the indepen-
dent directors' oversight, many of those issues would not
have been aired in public.
In addition to the recent, high-profile examples,
proponents argue that such cases are the exception
primarily because the system works. Again, the threat of
78 See Whether the Commission Should Enable Open-End Investment
Companies to be Organized and Operated Without Shareholder Voting,
Investment Company Act Release No. 12,888, [1983 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,303, at 85,613 (Dec. 10, 1982).79 See Stephanie A. Djinis & Amy L. Goodman, Director Independence
Challenged by Strougo Case, 4 Investment Lawyer 9 (1997) ("If our
experience is any barometer, independent directors take their duties
and responsibilities quite seriously in many cases rejecting or
countering the fund sponsor's proposals.")
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independent directors blowing the whistle deters
investment advisers from the most egregious violations.
For proof, proponents of the system cite case law under
Investment Company Act section 36(b)80 where defendant
directors have been found by courts to have performed well
in their oversight of advisory fees and of 12b- 1 plans.
C. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS PROVIDE A CHECK AGAINST
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Structurally, supporters of the current system argue
that only third party monitors such as independent
directors can adequately check the inherent conflict
associated with the external management of investment
companies. The Commission does not have the resources
to fill the gap, and sole reliance upon the market is
insufficient. First, there are significant costs to voting with
your feet in the form of commissions, redemption fees and
taxes that may make redemption unattractive. Second, by
the time shareholders learn about problems with a fund,
irreparable harm already may have been done.
D. THE COST OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IS De Minimus
Lastly, supporters of the current system argue that it
should be retained, even if there are only marginal
benefits, because the costs are de minimis. In a survey
performed by Lipper Analytical Services, Inc.81 it was
estimated that the industry-wide, dollar weighted average
cost to shareholders of independent directors is 0.005%, or
one-half of one basis point.
IV. CONCLUSION
Winston Churchill once said, "Democracy is the worst
form of government except all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time." In the case of independent
directors and their role under the Investment Company
80 15 U.S.C. § 35(b) (1998).
81 See letter from Lipper Analytical Services, Inc. to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, U. S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Oct. 9, 1990) (on file with
author).
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Act, the current system may not be perfect, but neither are
the various alternative structures.
Independent directors may be confused, and caught in
the cross fire, because the various marksmen are also
confused. The press would have you believe that it is the
duty of independent directors to keep fund expenses aslow as possible, and that they have failed miserably. The
Commission jawbones for the same action, yet its
enforcement actions target valuation problems or other
technical deficiencies; indeed, the Commission has never
sanctioned independent directors for failure to maintain
low expenses or even for failure to terminate poorly
performing investment advisers.8 2 Moreover, independent
directors are reluctant to drop the nuclear bomb over fees
or performance. Might that be because they shouldn't?
When Investment Company Act section 15 was enacted in
1940, Congress and the Commission were not concerned
with the magnitude of advisory fees. David Schenker, after
discussing certain state laws that limited management
and operating expenses to a percentage of assets, testified
that:
There is not a single provision in section 15 which even
remotely assumes to fix what [advisers] should be paid
in compensation 
.... We feel that is a question for the
stockholders to decide. If they want to pay a man a
million dollars to manage the fund and if they know they
are paying him a million dollars and if they have the
right to approve the payment of a million dollars, the bill
says that is perfectly all right. 83
82 See Jean W. Gleason, Mutual Fund Governance: Independent
Directors - Their Role and Incentives and Tools for Fulfilling It 1994MUTUAL FUNDS AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE. ("In fact, theSEC has rarely brought proceedings against independent directors,presumably because of concern that to do so might threaten thedelicate balance between the duties of the independent director and thepracticalities of their position .... )83 Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76thCong. 252 (1940) (statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel).
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In the 1960s, the Commission began to examine the
level of investment advisory fees.84 The Commission
concluded that the unique nature of the mutual fund
industry made arm's-length bargaining impossible, that
the marketplace consequently could not be relied upon to
curb excessive fees and that existing law did not
adequately protect investors with respect to such fees. The
Commission thereafter recommended that the Investment
Company Act be amended to include a "reasonableness"
standard for fees. This standard, however, was never
adopted. In 1970, Congress enacted Investment Company
Act section 36(b), which imposes a fiduciary duty on
investment advisers with respect to the amount of
compensation received.
Despite the criticisms and confusion, the corporate
governance structure, including the requirement of
independent directors, has served the investment
company industry fairly well for nearly 60 years. Perhaps,
in some instances, independent directors are too cozy with
management. Perhaps the respect of investment advisers
for their fiduciary duty, rather than independent director
oversight, has caused the investment company industry to
be remarkably scandal-free. Perhaps that respect for duty,
coupled with competitive pressures, will better address
rising fee and poor performance issues than would
increased independent director responsibilities or powers.
Perhaps it is time to try some form of a UIF. Perhaps it is
time to reconcile the independent investment company
director construct with the reality that an investment
company is an investment adviser-created, branded and
operated product. Perhaps it is time to amend the
Investment Company Act to give independent directors
more power and authority to perform their duties under
the Act. All these issues merit more debate.
Whether structural changes are ultimately adopted,
what we have now purports to depend upon effective
independent directors. A crucial element of an effective
independent director structure is a strong regulator,
8 4 See PPI, supra note 5: see also A Study of Mutual Funds - Prepared
for the Securities and Exchange Commission by the Wharton School of
Finance and Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274, at 37 (1962).
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dedicated to the success of that structure in the interest of
shareholders. Investment advisers, directors and
shareholders must know that the Commission will be
vigilant in its support of directors who do take action in an
appropriate case. Suppose, for example, that the president
of an investment adviser, who was also the president of a
mutual fund, allegedly used his powers and influence as
fund president to secretly and then overtly pursue the
interests of the adviser. Suppose he allegedly did the
following things.
First, without the knowledge of the independent
directors, he used the mutual fund's lawyers to draft a
proxy statement to remove the independent directors.
Second, he hired a proxy solicitation firm for the
investment adviser, and then, without the knowledge of
the independent directors, used his office of the president
of the mutual fund to appoint that same firm as the fund's
agent to receive fund shareholder voting lists.
Third, using his office of the president of the mutual
fund, without the knowledge of the independent directors,
he called a special meeting of shareholders of the fund so
that the investment adviser could seek proxies to remove
the fund's independent directors.
Fourth, he sent a letter to each of the independent direc-
tors announcing his actions, requesting their resignations
and threatening them with personal financial ruin if they
contested his actions or used mutual fund assets to mount
a counter-solicitation.
Suppose, after regaining their composure, the indepen-
dent directors immediately sent to the Commission an im-
passioned plea that could be summarized in four letters -
H.E.L.P.!
One might think that, if there were ever a time for the
Commission to act decisively and publicly in support of
independent directors, surely this would be such a case.85
85 Section 36(a) of the Act provides that:
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper
district court of the United States ... alleging that [any mutual fund
officer, director, investment adviser or principal underwriter] has
engaged ... or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting
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But suppose the Commission chose to basically sit on the
sidelines, referring to the matter as a state law corporate
governance dispute.
8 6
An industry insider once described an "ideal"
independent director as "management's best friend; the
type of friend that will take the keys away when you've had
too much to drink." If the Commission expects
independent directors to be the "first line of defense," then
it must support those directors who do take the keys away,
or it must share responsibility for allowing drunk drivers
to stay on the roads.
a breach of fiduciary duty ... and that the court may enjoin such
person from acting in any or all such capacities... and award ...
injunctive or other relief against such person.... 15 U.S.C. § 35(a)
(1998).
86 To give Chairman Levitt almost the last word, if only in a footnote,
the Chairman responded to such criticism of the Commission in his
recent speech on independent investment company directors as follows.
Some at the [Commission Roundtable on the Role of Independent
Investment Company Directors] made the point that the
Commission, in allocating key governance responsibilities to
independent directors, needs to be actively involved and pursue
charges of illegal conduct by fund managers whenever they occur. I
couldn't agree more.
Let me assure you that we have always taken allegations of
wrongdoing very seriously. You should know that even if our
findings can't be publicly revealed, we look into every allegation by
an independent director that the securities laws have been violated.
And if we find a violation, we take aggressive action to support them
and the interests of investors.
Some said that the Commission didn't do enough to support
independent directors during recent conflicts with management at
certain funds; that we took a neutral stance as we always do in
highly charged proxy battles. Some had gotten the impression that
the Commission didn't care or wasn't willing to take action. I think
it's fair to say that we at the Commission do listen, and we will
continue to look for opportunities to support independent directors
where appropriate. See Levitt Speech, supra note 57.
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